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 We employ school and year fixed-effects regression to determine the effect of voucher 
programs on the supply of private schools. In particular, we examine individual private schools 
in Washington, D.C., Indiana, and Louisiana as they transition into voucher program 
environments. We leverage the Private School Universe Survey to examine how schools self-
identify before and after switching into voucher environments. We find that upon switching into 
school voucher programs, private schools in more heavily regulated programs are more likely to 
identify as less specialized than they were prior to entering the program, and that those schools in 
more lightly regulated environments continue to highlight their specialized approach to 
education. These findings are examined within an institutional theory framework to understand 
the potential homogenizing effect of regulations on the diversity of the private school market. 
Keywords: private school; school choice; schooling supply; school vouchers; 














With the recent confirmation of Betsy DeVos as U.S. Education Secretary, and with 
growing state adoption of voucher and other educational choice models, private school choice 
has become an important topic. Since private school choice options are being proposed in 
numerous states across the country, it is especially important to examine the impacts that 
program design has on students and the private schools that participate. 
All but two of the twenty experimental evaluations of private school choice programs 
across the globe have found null to positive impacts on student achievement (Shakeel, Anderson, 
& Wolf, 2016). One of these exceptions was an evaluation of the Louisiana Scholarship Program 
(LSP) (Abdulkadiroglu, Pathak, & Walters, 2015), while the other is the most recent evaluation 
of the D.C. Opportunity Scholarship Program (OSP) (Dynarski et al., 2017). One theory for why 
the LSP produced large negative results is that the relatively high regulatory costs associated 
with program involvement disincentivized high quality schools from participating at all (Sude, 
DeAngelis, & Wolf, 2017). Likewise, the regulatory costs associated with program participation 
may lead to homogenization of the supply of schooling. A homogenous supply of schools could 
produce negative academic results through the failure to match interests of students and 
educators. 
As more private schools begin participating in a growing school voucher movement, the 
regulatory environment in which these school choice programs operate could reify existing 
norms about schooling while homogenizing a budding alternative education sector. If 
homogenization of the private school market occurs, it could do so in a way that limits 
innovation and, ultimately, the range of options available to families. We consider the impact of 
voucher participation on private schools in three locations through the lens of institutional 
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theory, adding to our understanding of choice program design in ways largely unexplored within 
education policy. 
Literature Review 
Impacts of Private School Choice 
 Scholars have conducted numerous evaluations of the impact of school choice on 
academic achievement, academic attainment, resulting competitive pressure on surrounding 
public schools, and the impact on parental satisfaction. Although there are other areas with 
considerable research on the impact of school choice, pertaining, for example, to the effects of 
competitive pressure on public schools (Egalite, 2013; Hoxby, 2001; Carnoy et al., 2007), parent 
perceptions of school safety (Wolf et al., 2013), civic values (Howell & Peterson, 2006; Fleming, 
Mitchell, & McNally, 2014; & Mills et al., 2016), fiscal impacts (Costrell, 2010; Scafidi, 2012), 
criminal activity (DeAngelis & Wolf, 2016), and integration (Greene & Winters, 2005; Greene, 
Mills, & Buck, 2010; Egalite, Mills, & Wolf, 2017), this brief review of the literature is confined 
to studies employing random assignment techniques, limiting the overview to the impact of 
school choice on academic achievement and attainment.  
Building off of Forster’s (2016) and Shakeel, Anderson, and Wolf’s (2016) reviews of 
school choice evaluations, we find 19 total studies using random assignment methods; 16 of 
which analyze the impact of school choice on academic achievement, and three of which 
examine academic attainment impacts. 
Student Achievement 
To date, researchers have conducted 16 evaluations of the impact of school choice on 
participants’ academic achievement using random assignment methods in the United States. Of 
those 16 evaluations, 10 found statistically significant positive gains on student achievement for 
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some or all students (Rouse, 1998; Greene, Peterson, & Du, 1999; Greene, 2000; Howell, Wolf, 
Campbell, & Peterson, 2002 (contains three studies); Barnard et al., 2003; Cowen, 2008; Jin, 
Barnard, & Rubin, 2010; Bitler et al., 2015), four found no impact (Krueger & Zhu, 2004; 
Bettinger & Slonim, 2006; Wolf et al., 2013; Mills & Wolf, 2017), and two found negative 
impacts on academic achievement as a result of voucher use (Abdulkadiroglu, Pathak, & 
Walters, 2015; Dynarski et al., 2017).  
Authors from the experimental LSP studies suggest that one possible explanation for 
negative effects on academic achievement, unique among RCT evaluations of school choice 
programs, could be due to the low quality of private schools participating in the program. Just 
one-third of private schools in Louisiana chose to participate in the voucher program, and 
evidence suggests those that did may have been experiencing declining enrollments – a lagging 
indicator of school quality – prior to enrolling in the LSP (Abdulkadiroglu, Pathak, & Walters, 
2015). Further, researchers have found that the lower quality private schools, as measured by 
tuition and enrollment levels, were more likely to participate in the LSP (Sude, DeAngelis, & 
Wolf, 2017). 
Student Attainment 
 Three evaluations employing random assignment methods have examined the impact of 
school choice on students’ academic attainment. All three found statistically significant 
improvements in attainment levels for school choice participants (Wolf et. al, 2013; Chingos & 
Peterson, 2013; Chingos & Peterson, 2015). Of note among the random assignment evaluations 
of the impact of school choice on academic attainment is the evaluation of the Washington, D.C. 
OSP. This evaluation of the impact of the D.C. OSP on student academic outcomes found that 
students who used a voucher to attend a private school of choice graduated at a rate 21-
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percentage points higher than the control group of students who applied for, but were not 
awarded a scholarship (Wolf et. al, 2013).  
Organizational Theory as a Framework 
Although the impact of school choice options such as vouchers has been studied at 
length, less consideration has been given to the impact the design of these programs can have on 
participating private schools’ operations and character. The body of literature undergirding 
organization theory, which examines the structure and functions of organizations (Scott, 1987), 
provides a useful framework for more fully understanding the impact of voucher program 
participation on private schools. One subset of organization theory, known as institutional 
theory, examines the processes organizations undertake in order to establish legitimacy in a 
given environment, and surveys the root causes that lead organizations to reproduce the 
characteristics of other organizations over time. Institutional theory holds that organizations 
adopt certain structures over time, “in order to gain legitimacy” (Westwood & Clegg, 2003, pg. 
279). Working under the same relative set of conditions, entities that are isomorphic will begin to 
take on the characteristics of other entities (Hawley, 1968), while new entrants into the market 
will “seek to overcome the liability of newness by imitating established practices within the 
field” (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983, pg. 156).  
This institutional isomorphism – what DiMaggio and Powell (1983) referred to as the 
“inexorable push toward homogenization” and what Dacin (1997) argued is the process of “fit” – 
complicates and shades what observers may have thought they knew about the impact of school 
voucher programs on the private education market.  
Complicating the Narrative: Institutional Isomorphism 
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When considered in the context of K-12 education, institutional theory suggests that 
schools may simply copy other schools to conform to existing rules to generate social legitimacy 
(Oplatka, 2004). The literature of institutional theory suggests that it is possible, even within a 
private school choice market, that schools’ structure will be constrained by the unwritten rules of 
what society considers schooling to be (Meyer, Scott, & Deal, 1992), and that schools will 
incorporate “rationalized myths,” adopting the vocabularies and organizational language of 
schools that preceded them (Meyer & Rowan, 1978). It is also the case that schools could simply 
copy the existing beliefs of the environment in which they operate – the state, city, charter 
management organization, or private school network – out of fear that not doing so will create 
the perception that they are failing schools (Oplatka, 2004). At the same time, isomorphism 
results from more than just the influence of organizations on other organizations (Dacin, 1997). 
Parents, for example, have been identified as “inherently conservative consumers” and their need 
for consumer information about schools leads to “standardized criteria for evaluation” 
(Lubienski, 2003, pg. 420). These pressures compete with notion that through school choice, 
practices will differ across schools. 
DiMaggio and Powell (1983) identified three types of isomorphic pressures: 1) coercive 
isomorphism, which includes formal and informal pressures to conform to existing systems, 2) 
mimetic isomorphism, which includes intentionally copying existing institutions in order to gain 
legitimacy, and 3) normative isomorphism, which includes unintentionally adopting the practices 
and values of other institutions and organizations. Although private schools, like any other 
education option, are susceptible to mimetic and normative isomorphic pressures, the types of 
regulations that govern private school voucher programs can determine whether coercive 
isomorphism occurs, limiting the diversity of private school type within a school choice 
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program. As Astley and Van de Ven (1983) opined, “The player remains free, but if he wants to 
win he must adopt a strategy in reasonable conformance with the rules, since a complete 
abandonment of the game cannot serve his interests” (pg. 252). If homogenization does occur, it 
will limit one of the central tenants of school choice – the idea that practices will differ across 
schools, and as such, that schools will respond to parent and community preferences in a way 
that meets family needs and local demands (Berends et al., 2010). 
Theory 
 Many voucher program proponents theorize that the additional financial incentives 
provided will entice market entry and specialized institutions. While this may appear intuitive in 
a setting where financial incentives are created spontaneously through dispersed customer-driven 
demand, the relationship is not so clear when the funding is provided from a centralized body. 
Since centralized direction is, by definition, comprehensively uniform, we should not expect that 
schooling providers will be more specialized. Moreover, since schooling regulation intends to 
limit the types of choices available to families, we should expect less heterogeneity in the supply 
of private schools. 
 Whenever an individual or institution receives funding from a provider, the provider is 
able to exercise some form of control over the receiving establishment. After all, the provider 
sends money to specific institutions if, and only if, they perceive to experience benefits from the 
transaction that exceed the costs. Oftentimes, the realized benefit is in the form of donor 
autonomy over the receiving organization. In order to ensure that the investment will be 
worthwhile, providers have the incentive to attach conditions to the transaction. 
 In the case of voucher programs, the provider of public funding is the taxpayers and the 
potential receiving institutions are private schools. Not surprisingly, in order to receive public 
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funding for schooling operation, private schools must adhere to certain regulations determined 
through democratic institutions. Scholars theorize that if individuals choose goods and services 
based on rational self-interest, their choices may inadvertently harm society as a whole (Pigou, 
1920). In other words, voluntary transactions between producers and consumers could affect 
involuntary third parties. Since positive and negative externalities may result from an 
unrestricted market, some economists argue that government regulation is necessary to protect 
society overall (Bator, 1958). For example, economists argue that a tax ought to be placed on 
companies that produce pollution, which harms the environment and the health of citizens that 
did not voluntarily enter the transaction. However, even the founder of the Pigovian tax, Arthur 
Pigou, cautioned that attempts to remedy market failures could result in even larger government 
failures (Pigou, 1920; Tullock, Brady, & Seldon, 2002).  
Some of the voucher program regulations, such as financial reporting and auditing, may 
not impose large costs on participating private schools. Others, however, may inadvertently 
change the overall mission, strategy, and composition of private schools. Costly conditions tied 
to funding include standardized testing requirements, open-admissions processes, teacher 
certification requirements, and the prohibition of parental copayment.  
 Private schools have a strong financial incentive to participate in voucher programs, 
especially since they are directly competing with a product that is free at the point of delivery: 
traditional public schools and public charter schools. Out of rational self-interest, schools choose 
to participate in programs; however, these choices may lead to private schools that look very 
much like traditional public schools if program regulations are decided by the same process that 
determines the operation of residentially assigned public schools. In that case, the conditions will 
reflect the traditional setting.  
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The more costly and extensive the regulatory environment, the more likely it is that 
private institutions will behave like public schools. As a result, we expect that more highly 
regulated voucher program environments will increase homogenization of the supply of schools, 
with those that face the largest regulatory environments being the most likely to become 
isomorphic to their public school counterparts.  
The Programs 
Indiana Choice Scholarship Program 
In 2011, Indiana launched its Choice Scholarship Program (CSP), which provides 
vouchers to eligible children to attend a private school of choice. More than 34,600 students 
currently participate in the CSP, which is open to children from families earning up to 150 of the 
federal poverty line ($67,433 for a family of four during the 2016-17 academic year) or up to 200 
percent of poverty for children with special needs (EdChoice, 2017). The regulations governing 
the CSP are considerable: the state is permitted to review private school curricula, instruction, 
classroom materials, and private schools must administer the state test. State testing outcomes 
and graduation rates of participating private schools are also used to assign an A-F letter grade, 
and schools receiving a D or F grade for two consecutive years lose program participation 
eligibility (EdChoice, 2017). Schools must also have sound accounting practices in place. 
Although these regulations are substantial, many private schools already adhered to some of 
them as a condition of participation in the Indiana High School Athletics Association (Cavazos, 
2016). 
D.C. Opportunity Scholarship Program 
In 2004, Congress established the first federal K-12 school choice program, in the form 
of the D.C. OSP. More than 1,100 eligible children currently use an OSP voucher to attend a 
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private school of choice in the District. To be eligible, children must come from families earning 
less than $44,955 annually for a family of four (EdChoice, 2017). The D.C. OSP is relatively 
lightly regulated. Private school students using a voucher must take a nationally norm-referenced 
test, but the private school they attend is not required to administer the exam. Private schools 
must also allow site visits by the program administrator, and must have sound accounting 
systems in place. 
Louisiana Scholarship Program 
 The Louisiana Scholarship Program was established as a statewide voucher program in 
2012. It had previously be confined to New Orleans, operating within Orleans Parish since 2008. 
Some 7,100 students currently participate in the LSP, which is open to children from families 
earning less than $60,750 annually, and who have also attended an underperforming school 
(rated C, D, F, or T) during the previous school year, are entering kindergarteners, or were 
enrolled in a public school in the Recovery School District (RSD).  
The LSP is highly regulated. Participating private schools must use open enrollment, 
students on a scholarship must take the uniform state test, and schools must maintain a 
curriculum deemed on par with public schools (EdChoice, 2017). Participating private schools 
must employ a testing coordinator who must attend Board of Elementary and Secondary 
Education (BESE) testing workshops and any additional training required to administer the tests 
(Bulletin 133, 2014). The Louisiana Department of Education also monitors overall testing 
implementation and conducts school visits during testing periods (Bulletin 133, 2014). Schools 
with more than 10 scholarship students in each grade or more than 40 students overall are 
assigned a Scholarship Cohort Index (SCI) score. Schools that receive an SCI below 50 in year 
two an onward, or have less than a 25 percent proficiency rate on state assessments, are barred 
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from enrolling new scholarship students during the subsequent year (Annual Report, 2013-2014). 
For private schools that do provide special education services, they must provide information 
about what services will be offered, and must contrast that with the special education services the 
local school system provides. They must publish their tuition and fees, and must cap tuition at 
the amount charged to students without scholarships. 
The major differences across program regulatory environments can be found in Table 1 
below. As illustrated, the LSP has the most requirements for participating schools, and the 
Center for Education Reform (2014) gave the LSP the lowest grade for regulatory freedom. 
Table 1: Regulatory Burdens for Each Program 
Variable Indiana DC Louisiana 
Date Enacted 2011 2004 2008 
Average Funding Relative to Public School 42% 47% 54% 
Eligibility Rate 59% 35% 20% 
Private School Participation Rate 70% 78% 33% 
Testing Requirement X X X 
Open-Admissions Process   X 
Financial Reporting X X X 
Parental Copay Prohibited   X 
Teacher Requirements  X  
Center for Education Reform Regulatory Score1 A B C 
 
Data 
 We use data from the nationally representative Private School Universe Survey from the 
school year 1999-00 to 2011-12. The target population for this survey is all private schools in the 
United States as defined by National Center for Education Statistics. Since the database contains 
unique school IDs for each period, we are able to follow individual schools over time. Since the 




survey is completed every other school year, we use seven periods of data. For the LSP and the 
OSP, we use three periods before the voucher program enactment and two periods of data 
afterwards. For the IN CSP, however, we could only use one period of data after the intervention 
since the program was enacted and launched in 2011. 
 We are interested in five outcome variables located in the Private School Universe 
Survey questionnaire2 related to potential homogenization of individual schools. This 
information is located in questions 7b, 8a, 12, and 14a. These questions ask whether the school is 
coeducational (Co-Ed), whether the school has a religious orientation or purpose, and the overall 
purpose or type of school. The different types of schools that we are interested include: regular, 
specialized (such as science/math, performing arts, gifted and talented, foreign language 
immersion), and alternative / non-traditional education. We are also interested in the percent of 
white students within a school to assess how program participation impacts study body 
composition. 
Table 2: Timeline of Data Used 
Program 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 
CSP (Indiana)      Y Y 
OSP (D.C.) Y Y Y Y Y   
LSP (Louisiana)   Y Y Y Y Y 
Note: “Y” indicates that a period is used. Thick black vertical lines indicate the period of 
voucher program enactment. 
Methods 
We use a school and year fixed effects regression approach of the form: 
Outcomeit = β0 + β1Voucherit + αi + εit 
Where Outcome is one of the six dependent variables of interest for school i at time period t. Our 
six dependent variables of interest are the percent of white students and whether or not the 




school, i, identified itself as Co-Ed, Religious, Regular Ed, Specialized, or an Alternative / Non-
Traditional school in period t. 
 Voucher is the independent variable of interest, whether or not the institution was located 
in an educational market that had a voucher program in place, for school i in period t. We expect 
that the coefficient of interest, β1, will indicate more homogenization in the most-regulated 
program: the LSP. Since the other two programs have fewer regulations overall, we expect that 
the relationship will be less significant for the DC OSP and the IN CSP. Since these programs 
are targeted to low-income families, we expect that β1 will indicate more racial diversity within 
schools. 
Since many observable characteristics of schools can be argued as relatively constant 
over time, we present results for the year and school-level fixed-effects models without time-
variant controls. In fact, including any controls at all would bias our estimates towards zero since 
we simply wish to observe the impact of the market environment on school-level characteristics. 
In other words, any characteristic of a school is an outcome of the school’s competitive 
environment. Most importantly, our methods allow us to compare individual schools to 
themselves, over time, as they switch into voucher settings. As a robustness check, we use a 
random effects probit regression model as well. Since individual schools choose to identify as 
one of several different types of institutions, we also use a multinomial probit regression model 
as a robustness check. Since our sample sizes are all too small to rely on maximum likelihood 






Table 3: Descriptive Statistics by Program 
Variable N Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
CSP (Indiana)      
Year 1381 2011 1 2010 2012 
Enrollment 1381 156 184.74 1 1452 
White (Percent) 1381 83.86 23.62 0 100 
Co-Ed 1381 0.99 0.08 0 1 
Religious 1381 0.12 0.32 0 1 
Regular Ed 1381 0.84 0.36 0 1 
Voucher Period 1381 0.49 0.50 0 1 
Specialized 1381 0.01 0.10 0 1 
Alternative / Other 1381 0.02 0.14 0 1 
OSP (D.C.)      
Year 430 2004 2.21 2000 2008 
Enrollment 430 202 224.84 2 1097 
White (Percent) 430 31.36 36.03 0 100 
Co-Ed 430 0.93 0.26 0 1 
Religious 430 0.50 0.50 0 1 
Regular Ed 430 0.64 0.48 0 1 
Voucher Period 430 0.39 0.49 0 1 
Specialized 430 0.07 0.25 0 1 
Alternative / Other 430 0.03 0.17 0 1 
LSP (Louisiana)      
Year 1893 2008 2.85 2004 2012 
Enrollment 1893 341 277.73 1 1745 
White (Percent) 1893 72 31.66 0 100 
Co-Ed 1893 0.94 0.25 0 1 
Religious 1893 0.13 0.34 0 1 
Regular Ed 1893 0.88 0.32 0 1 
Voucher Period 1893 0.58 0.49 0 1 
Specialized 1893 0.02 0.12 0 1 
Alternative / Other 1893 0.02 0.14 0 1 
 
Results 
 Private schools in Indiana did not change their overall school missions as a result of 
switching into a voucher program environment; however, individual private schools became 
slightly more-inclusive of minority students. Specifically, Indiana private schools were about a 
percentage point more inclusive of minority students after switching into a voucher environment. 
These results are as expected: the voucher program in Indiana has a moderate level of regulations 
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for private schools, many of which, as mentioned before, were already adhered to by private 
schools for inclusion into the athletics association, and low-income students are those that are the 
least well served in their residentially-assigned schools.  
CSP 
Table 4: The Effect of the IN CSP on Homogenization 
 Co-Ed Religious Regular Specialized  Alternative White 
 
Voucher 0.000 -0.003 0.006 -0.005 -0.006 -1.125* 
 (1.000) (0.318) (0.206) (0.083) (0.206) (0.012) 
       
School/Year 
Fixed Effects 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
       
R2 Within 0.0000 0.0016 0.0026 0.0048 0.0026 0.0100 
Time Periods 2 2 2 2 2 2 
Schools 755 755 755 755 755 755 
N 1381 1381 1381 1381 1381 1381 
Note: All models use school and year fixed effects regression from 2010 to 2012. P-values in 
parentheses.  * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001  
 
 Private schools in D.C. have around a ten-percentage point lower likelihood of describing 
themselves as providing an alternative or non-traditional education after switching into the 
voucher environment. This is over half of a standard deviation decrease in the alternative 
classification in D.C. Importantly, the D.C. voucher program does not allow participating 
schools to have control their admissions processes. Schools that provide non-traditional or 
alternative educational services face substantial costs associated with accepting a diverse set of 
students, so they have an incentive to adapt their model to fit all types of students. It also appears 
that private schools switching in the D.C. voucher environment have around an eight-percentage 
point higher likelihood of describing themselves as a “regular” school; however, this result is 
only marginally significant at a p-value of 0.076. The voucher program does not appear to affect 
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the racial composition of private schools in D.C., perhaps because of a lack of student race 
variation in this particular sample. 
OSP 
Table 5: The Effect of the DC OSP on Homogenization 
 Co-Ed Religious Regular Specialized  Alternative White 
 
Voucher 0.000 0.002 0.083 0.023 -0.098** 0.656 
 (1.000) (0.879) (0.076) (0.530) (0.002) (0.751) 
       
School/Year 
Fixed Effects 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
       
R2 Within 0.0000 0.0188 0.0161 0.0131 0.0492 0.0173 
Time Periods 5 5 5 5 5 5 
Schools 148 148 148 148 148 148 
N 430 430 430 430 430 430 
Note: All models use school and year fixed effects regression from 2000 to 2008. P-values in 
parentheses.  * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001  
 
 The most interesting results emerge for the program that attaches the most regulations to 
voucher funding. As expected, the LSP appears to create homogenization within the private 
schooling sector for most of the measured outcomes. As a result of switching into the LSP 
environment, private schools in Louisiana have a 3.6-percentage point higher likelihood of 
describing themselves as regular, a 2.2-percentage point lower likelihood of describing 
themselves as specialized, and a 1.5-percentage point lower likelihood of describing themselves 
as non-traditional or alternative. These results range from around a tenth to a fifth of a standard 
deviation. In addition, the coefficients on Co-Ed and Religious are in their expected directions, 
indicating less specialization; however, these are not statistically significant, as their p-values are 
around 0.15 and 0.16, respectively. Private schools in Louisiana experienced a 5.6-percentage 
point increase in minority students through switching into the voucher environment. This follows 
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intuition, as the LSP is targeted to the least-advantaged students based on income and school 
quality. 
LSP 
Table 6: The Effect of the LSP on Homogenization 
 Co-Ed Religious Regular Specialized Alternative White 
 
Voucher 0.005 -0.020 0.036** -0.022* -0.015* -5.642*** 
 (0.149) (0.160) (0.001) (0.012) (0.049) (0.000) 
       
School/Year 
Fixed Effects 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
       
R2 Within 0.0029 0.1553 0.0099 0.0071 0.0036 0.0447 
Time Periods 5 5 5 5 5 5 
Schools 532 532 532 532 532 532 
N 1893 1893 1893 1893 1893 1893 
Note: All models use school and year fixed effects regression from 2004 to 2012. P-values in 
parentheses.  * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. Results for regular and alternative are also 
robust to the random effects probit regression model and the multinomial probit regression 
model.  
 
Conclusion and Policy Implications 
 Our results support our hypothesis that highly regulated voucher program environments 
induce homogenization in the supply of schools. We argue that the results are causal estimates of 
the impact of regulations on the homogenization of schools for a few reasons: (1) our 
econometric methodology allows us to control for all time-invariant characteristics of private 
schools, (2) our analysis compares three different regulatory environments, finding the strongest 
homogenizing effects for the LSP, fewer effects for the OSP, and no effects for the CSP, and (3) 




 Intuitively, homogenization in the supply of schools could at least partially have led to 
the negative experimental achievement results for the LSP. If student needs, learning abilities, 
desires, and interests are unique, specialized services should lead to improved outcomes. On the 
other hand, homogenization could lead to negative impacts for students, even if children are 
switching into an identical environment, since students must adapt to costs associated with 
moving schools. 
 Since private school choice programs are being proposed in several locations across the 
United States, decision-makers ought to pay close attention to policy design. While additional 
regulations often appear beneficial, especially since they give policy-makers the illusion of 
control, costs of program participation can lead to unintended consequences for children. Our 
estimates indicate that additional regulations could reduce specialization in the supply of 
schooling, and, as a result, fewer choices for families. If the diverse backgrounds, interests, and 
abilities of children are not matched with the available institutions, educational choice programs 
could fail to lead to improved outcomes. Consequently, decision-makers must balance the costs 
of regulation, such as homogenization in the supply of schools, with the benefits of regulation, 
such as perceived control, in order to design the educational choice policies that work best for 
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